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NOTES
THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MINIMUM COMMISSION
RATE STRUCTURE: ANTITRUST ON WALL STREET
In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,l the Supreme Court refrained
from totally immunizing the activities of the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) from the restraints of the antitrust laws by exempting only those
"particular instances of exchange self-regulation which fall within the
scope arid purposes of the Securities ·Exchange Act .... " 2 While this decision represented a unique approach to the continuing controversy over
the accommodation of two conflicting economic modelil-the regulatory
and the competitive-it left to the lower federal courts the task of determining the exact scope of the Exchange's exemption on a case-by-case
basis. In Kaplan v. Lehman Brothers 4 one aspect of the Exchange's selfregulatory system, the minimum rate structure, was unsuccessfully attacked
as violative of the antitrust laws, and after the Supreme Court denied
certiorari,5 Wall Street financiers thought the battle had been won. 6 Far
tfrom being settled, however, the issue has again been spotlighted. In a
memorandum7 submitted in response to the Securities and Exchange Commission's invitation for comments on a proposed rule to modify the rate
1373 U.S. 341 (1963), discussed at notes 94-107 hrfra and accompanying text. Silver
was the "first and only expression of the Supreme Court with respect to the relationslip between the securities laws and the antitrust laws . . . ." 111 CoNG. REc. 19019
(1965) (letter from Manuel F. Cohen, SEC Chairman, to Sen. A. Willis Robertson,
Chairman of Senate Committee on Banlring and Currency.)
2 373 U.S. at 361.
B See, e.g., Helrnetag, Railroad Mergers: Tbe Accom:modation of tbe Interstate Commerce Act and Antitrust Policies, 54 VA. L. REv. 1493 (1968).
4 250 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ill. 1966), aff'd, 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 954 (1967), discussed at notes 108-119 infra and accompanying text.
5 389 U.S. 954 (1967) CWarren, C. J., dissenting).
6 The Wall Street Journal, referring to the case as a "landmark action," grossly
overstated its holding by concluding that the NYSE was "immune from antitrust challenge in fixing uniform commission rates . . . ." Wall St. Journal, Nov. 14, 1967, at
2, col. 1.
7 Selected C011mzents on SEC Proposed Rule on Give-ups and NYSE Proposal on
Commission Rates, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. No. 198 at 16-31 (extra ed. May 3, 1968)
[hereinafter cited as SEC C011mzents on Proposed Rule]. On January 17, 1969, the
Department of Justice :filed another memorandum proposing a five-year plan for the
gradual elimination of :fixed commission rates. Fixed rates on all trading exceeding
$50,000 would be abolished immediately; thereafter, the ceiling would be lowered by
$10,000 per year. Department of Justice, Memorandum of the Department of Justice
before the SEC, Commission Rate Structure of Registered National Securities Exchanges, File No. 4-144, Jan. 17, 1969 [hereinafter cited as Justice Dep't Memo.].
[ 661]
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structure, 8 the Department of Justice challenged the antitrust exemption
afforded the minimum commission rates. This "surprising entry" 9 prodded
the SEC to hold public hearings10 to explore "whether a minimum exchange
"n
commission rate structure is necessary, and if so to what extent .
OVERVIEW OF THE CoMMISSION RATE STRUCTURE

The antitrust problems currently raised by the 1'-T'iSE's rate structure have
their origin in the rules and practices which have traditionally characterized the Exchange and have determined its relationship to the rest of the
securities industry. 12 The NYSE has set its own commission rates since the
Buttonwood Agreement of 1792. 13 These minimum rates,I-4 prescribed by
8 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 (Jan. 26, 1968) (restricting give-ups).
See note 37 infra.
9 vVall St. Journal, April 30, 1968, at 34, coL 1. Nor did the challenge escape the
fanfare of election year politics. President NL'I:On, during the recent campaign, referred
to the Justice Department intervention as a "heavy-handed bureaucratic regulatory"
scheme, Wall St. Journal, Oct. 3, 1968, at 4, col. 3, and a Republican National Committeeman instituted suit to delay SEC proposals until after the inauguration of the new
president, YVashington Post, Oct. 12, 1968, at E7, col. 1.
lO SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8324 (May 28, 1968). For statutory
authority to call public hearings, see 15 U.S.C. § 78u (a) (1964).
Congressional leaders have also expressed a keen interest in the subject. See \Vash·
ington Post, Dec. 14, 1968, at E9, coL 1 (Sen. Harrison \Villiams, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Bani{ing and Currency,
announced future hearings to consider the antitrust implications of minimum commission rates); \Vall St. Journal, Dec. 11, 1968, at 3, coL 2 (Rep. Emanuel Celler,
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, urged antitrust action against the 1'-.lYSE
to invalidate Exchange Rule 394 which restricts members from trading listed stocks
with nonmembers). See notes 46-47 infra.
l l SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8324 (May .28, 1968) (letter from Manuel
F. Cohen, SEC Chairman, to Robert vV. Haack, President of the NYSE).
12 For a con1prehensive discussion of the N\!SE's rate structure, see F~EPOHT OF
SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND ExcHANGE CoMTviJSSION,
H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 294-351 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
SPECIAL STUDY]. This study was the product of a Congressional directive to the SEC
"to make a study and investigation of the adequacy, for the protection of investors,
of the rules of national securities exchanges and national securities associations ...." 15
U.S.C. § 7Bs(d) (1964). See also H.R. REP. No. 882, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
J3
vVe, the Subscribers, Brokers for the Purchase and Sale of Public Stoclc, do
hereby solemnly promise and pledge ourselves to each other, that we will not
buy or sell from this day for any person whatsoever, any kind of Public Srock
at a less rate than one-quarter percent Commission on the Specie value, and
that we will give a preference to each other in our Negotiations. In Testimony
whereof we have set our hands this 17th day of May, at New Yor1{, 1792.
SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 295, quoting A. EA;vms, THE NEw YoRK STOCK ExcHANGE 14
(1894).
14 In practice, however, " [ t] he minimum has become the maximum." R. BAimR ci
IV. CARY, CoRPORATIONS, CASES AND MATERL\LS 718 (Supp. 1968). See note 39 infra.
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the NYSE Constitution, 11; are compulsory for Exchange membership, 16
and are followed by the American Stock Exchange and the regional exchanges.17
Besides :fixing the commission for ordinary transactions, the rate structure
precludes price competition on volume trading and ancillary services. Rates
are :fixed as a percentage of the value of each round lot u; regardless of the
size of the transaction. 19 This round-lot system does not allow for any
volume or block discount, despite the fact that the cost of handling a transaction involving a large number of shares is not proportionately higher
than the cost of a smaller volume transaction. Ancillary services comprise
a wide spectrum of activity, including the safekeeping of customer securities, collecting dividends on stock left in the broker's care, forwarding
proxy materials, furnishing investment advice and obtaining market quotations.20 The rigid rate structure includes the cost of services in the commission fee whether or not a customer takes advantage of them, but the
provision of these services remains "the most significant area of competition
among members of the Exchange." 21
The NYSE rules discriminate in favor of members by charging them
markedly lower rates than are charged nonmembers and by permitting
members to pay separate rates for clearing and executing rather than the
all-inclusive rate paid by outsiders. 22 Moreover, members are permitted to
u;

[T]hese commissions shall be at rates not less than the rates in this Article prescribed; and shall be net and free from any rebate, return, discount or allowance
made in any shape or manner, or by any method or arrangement direct or
indirect.
NYSE CoNsT. art XV, § I, reprinted in 2 CCH NYSE GuiDE~ 1701 (1962).
No member, allied member, member :firm or member corporation shall make a
proposition for the transaction of business at less than the minimum rates of
commission prescribed in this Article.
NYSE CaNsT. art. XV, § 7, reprinted in 2 CCH NYSE GuiDE~ 1707 (1962).
Any return, rebate, discount or allowance of commission resulting from an
order given by a member ... and payable by a member ... of another exchange
in connection with the execution of such order shall be collected by the member . . . giving such order and may not be shared with a non-member of the
Exchange.
NYSE CaNsT. art. XV, § 8, reprinted in 2 CCH NYSE GuiDE~ 1708 (1962).
16 NYSE CoNST. art. XV,§ 7, reprinted in 2 CCH NYSE Guide~ 1707 (1962), see note
15 supra. NYSE members transact approximately 80% of the business on the national
exchanges. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 at 4 n.2 (Jan. 26, 1968).
17 "Since 1958, the rates have been identical, and the rules governing commissions
have also been similar in scope and effect. When the NYSE changed its nonmember
rates in 1959, the Amex promptly followed suit." SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 299.
18 Round lots consist of multiples of 100 shares. A different procedure is used for
odd-lot transactions. !d. at 325. For a general discussion of odd-lot dealers, see id. at
171-202.
19 !d. at 31 I.
20 !d. at 321.
21Jd.
22Jd. at 297. Member rates can be separated into executing only, clearing only and
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split fees among themselves, whereas such arrangements with nonmembers
are prohibited. 23 This discrimination naturally has adverse effects on the
nonmember professional; in order to retain his customer's business, a nonmember dealing in securities traded only on the NYSE is forced to charge
the customer the same commission which he pays to the NYSE member,
thereby incurring a loss equal to the expenses incident to the transaction. As
'.vith other Exchange .iules, the J\JYSE insures compliance "\Vith its commission rate rules by fining, 2 4 suspending or expelling25 violators.
The prospect of losing the business of nonmember professionals has led
to the development of practices by which members can circumvent the Exchange's rigid rate structure. The anti-rebate rule can be bypassed ~hrough
various reciprocal business arrangemehts 2 6 whereby I'\f'iSE members return
commission business to nonmembers. This can be accomplished if a NYSE
member places business with a broker who is only a member of a regional
exchange even though the NYSE member occupies a seat 27 on the regional
exchange or the stock is also listed on the Big Board. 28 A similar result is
achieved by referring over-the-counter business to nonmembers in cases
where the l'.TYSE member possess adequate facilities to execute the transaction himself. Another variant calls for reciprocity in the form of special
services. The clearance of nonexchange transactions,2ll office space,<HJ installation and maintenance of wire services,31 special research 32 and promotional
materials and displays are all sanctioned- conduits through w!:Uch returns
clearing and executing. Executing consists of using the facilities of the Exchange
to locate a seller (or buyer) and consummating the trade. Clearing involves making
the arrangements for actual exchange of stock certificates. !d. at 295.
23NYSE CoNST., art. XV,§ 8, reprinted in 2 CCI-I NYSE GUIDE~ 1708 (1962), see
note 15 supra.
24 NYSE CoNsT., art. A.'1V, § 13, reprinted in 2 CCH NYSE GumE en 1663 (1962).
25 N\!SE CaNsT., art. XIV, § 6, 1·eprimed in 2 CCH NYSE GumE qj 1656 (1962). An
illustration of the severity of NYSE penalties was provided in a recent action in which
the N'lSE suspended and fined a member 1~10,000 for violating the anti-rebate rules.
\Vall St. Journal, Oct. 11, 1968, at 5, col. 2.
26 For a general discussion of these practices among the mutual funds, see SPECIAL
STUDY, pt. 4, at 213-35.
27 See The Rules of the New York Stock Exchange, 10 S.E.C. 270 (1941) ("multiple
trading case" in which the SEC invalidated the 1\IYSE rule prohibiting members from
trading listed securities on the regional exchanges). See generally SPECIAL STuDY,
pt. 2, at 923-24.
28 SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 302. A NYSE member need only name a regional-only
member as a "clearing agent" on the regional exchange for him to receive up to a 50%
split fee under the regional exchange rules irrespective of the functions performed.
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 at 5 (Jan. 26, 1968).
29 Rule 381, 1·ep1·inted in 2 CCH NYSE GumE qj 2381.18 (1962).
30Rule 343, reprinted in2 CCH NYSE GUIDE en 2343.11 (1962).
31 Rule 359, Teprimed in 2 CCI-I NYSE GumE ~ 2359.10 (1962).
32 Rule 440, rep1"inted in 2 CCH NYSE GumE ~ 2440A (1962).
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to nonmembers are permitted by the Exchange, even though the equivalent
in cash is prohibited.33
The most controversial of the remunerative methods is the so-called
"give-up." 34 Not only does this device circumvent the anti-rebate rule, but
it also allows discounts on volume transactions. In its most elementary form,
a customey-3-5 directs that a specified percent of the executing broker's commission, sometimes as high as sevenry:...five percent/~6 be given up to a
designated broker. In effect, the executing NYSE broker acts as a vehicle
through which an institutional investor can reward other brokers for
services unrelated to the particular transaction, such as promoting mutual
fund shares or supplying statistics, research, wire facilities and quotations.~ 7
If the designated broker is a member of the NYSE and therefore within
the ambit of the Exchange's fee-splitting rules, the give-up may be in cash;
otherwise, other reciprocal devices are used. 38 The impact of the give-up
in undermining the NYSE rate schedule has been intensified by the fact
that a dual member is subject to the more permissive regional exchange
rules when trading on the regional exchanges. NYSE nonmembers have
gained "practical access to the New York Stock Exchange" 39 because sub33 Rule 369(1), Teprinted in 2 CCH NYSE GUIDE ~2369 (1962). The Special Study
accurately commented that this distinction was "obviously a fine one." SPECIAL SnmY,
pt. 2, at 304.
34 Professor Paul Samuelson has called the device "nefarious." NEWSWEEK, Sept. 23,
1968, at 89. See also SEC, REPoRT oN THE PuBuc PoLicY IMPLICATioNs oF lNVIDSTM:ENT
Co. GRowm, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 4, at 162-88 (1966).
35 The principal users are institutional investors, including mutual funds, foundations,
insurance companies, educational institutions, pension funds and trust departments of
banks. SPECIAL Sruny, pt. 2, at 837.
36 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 at 3 (Jan. 26, 1968).
37 SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 317. Give-ups also create substantial conflicts of interests
for the a managers of the investment companies because the channeled income is used
to serve their own self-interests rather than benefit the stockholders of the fund. SEC
Securities Release No. 8239 at 9 (Jan. 26, 1968); 33 SEC ANN. REP. 8 (1967). As a
result of reciprocal agreements the managers are pressured into transacting business
with participating nonmembers rather than selecting the best available market in terms
of cost, managerial experience and expertise of the individual firm. SPECIAL STUDY,
pt. 2, at 309-10. Accordingly, SEC rule IOb-10, proposed pursuant to the antifraud
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1964), the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-l to 80b-21 (1964), and certain
proVisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52
(1964), "would prohibit investment company managers from directing brol{ers executing transactions for an investment company to divide their compensation in any way
with other brokers unless the benefits of such division accrue to the investment company and its shareholders." SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 at I (Jan.
26, 1968).
38 See notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
39 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 at 11 (Jan. 26, 1968) (letter from
Robert W. Haack, NYSE president, to Exchange members). These practices induced
Mr. Haack to remark that the rate structure "is ceasing to be a 'ininirnum.'" !d.
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stantially all of the securities traded on the regional exchanges are also
traded on the Big Board4o and fee splitting with brokers who are not members of the regional exchanges is sanctioned by the rules of the regional
exchanges. Thus, the give-up system has resulted in a channeling of business
from the NYSE to the regional exchanges.41 Moreover, institutional investors, attempting to irnErove their JlO~itions, have secured seats on the
regional exchanges 42 for affiliates whose sole function is to obtain give-ups
and other reciprocal benefits for their. institutional sponsors. 43
The rigidity of the rate structure has also led to an increase in the trading
of NYSE listed securities in the over-the-counter market. This so-called
third market 44 is composed of nonmember firms whose operations are
geared to the needs of the institutional customers. 45 Exchange Rule
394(a) 46 'prohibits NYSE members from dealing in this market without prior
permission.47 Free from the restrictions of Exchange rules, the third market
permits rate reductions on volume trading and eliminates the costs of an40 !d.

at 4 n.2.
See, e.g., Phalon, Regional Exchanges A1oving in on Big Board-From Boston to
the Coast, Their Trading is Mounting, -N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1965, § 3, at 1, col. 3.
42 See, e.g., Jennings, The New York Stock Exchange and tbe Cmmnission Rate
Struggle, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 1119, 1142-43 (1965) (mutual fund affiliates, as members of
regional exchanges, can trade in NYSE listed stocks without paying a commission to a
NYSE member).
43 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 at 3 (Jan. 26, 1968). !he NYSE
has asked the SEC for a moratorium on institutional membership pending the outcome
of the SEC hearings. Wall St. Journal, May 5, 1969, at 6, col. 2.
44 The term was first used by the Special Study. For a general discussion of this
market, see SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, 870-911; Weeden, Tbe Tbird Market, DuKE UmVERSITY ScHOOL OF LAw CoNFERENCE ON SECURITIES REGuLATION 171-90 (Mundheirn ed.
1965); Polakoff & Sanetz, Tb~ Third Market-Tbe Nature of Competition in tbe Market
for Listed Securities Traded Off-Board, 11 ANTimusT BuLL. 191 (1966); Comment, Tbe
Tbird Market-C/:Jallenge to the New York Stock Exc/:Jange, 20 Sw. L.J. 640 (1966).
Use of the third market should be distinguished from reciprocity agreements as a
means of escaping the inflexibility of the NYSE rate structure. Give-ups are proper
only where fixed commission rates exist; therefore, they are not used on the third
market. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 at 5 (Jan. 26, 1968).
In addition to the exchanges, over-the-counter trading in unlisted securities, and the
third market, there exists a so-called "fourth market" in which institutional investors
deal directly with each other. See Silberman, Bypassing Brokers-Institutional Investors
Begin Trading Stocks Directly Among Tbemselves, Wall St. Journal, Jan. 11, 1965,
at 1, col. I.
45 The third market is not a complete market for bro]rers; instead, it includes a
limited variety of securities that are favored by institutional investors. Jennings, supra
noi:e 42, at 1151.
-4'6 Except as otherwise specifically exempted by the Exchange, members and
member organizations must obtain the permission of the Exchange before effecting
a transaction in a listed stock off the Exchange, either as principal or agent.
Rule 394(a), reprinted in 2 CCH NYSE GmnE ~ 2394 (1962).
47At the SEC hearings, both Exchange Rule 394(a) and Rule 394(b), which pro41
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cillary services which are "of little interest or value" to institutional investors.48 Besides offering reduced commission rates, third market trading
involves less delay for large block transactions and avoids a ticker report with
its attendant influence on prices.

The &te Structure: Subsequent Developments
The intervention of the Department of Justice stimulated activity by the
SEC and pressured the NYSE into reluctant reforms. 49 Prior to this intervention commission rate negotiations between the SEC and the Exchange
had been unproductive; 50 since then, the SEC riot only ordered the recent
hearings but also submitted an interim schedule 51 to the Exchange which
included a volume discount and a caveat that the matter of give-ups was
still "under continuing consideration." 52 Although the pressure of the Justice Department may appear to be an encroachment upon SEC jurisdiction,
it does give the SEC leverage in dealing with the Exchange.53 Negotiations
have led to the adoption of a NYSE plan54 which provides for a volume disvides for a cumbersome and ineffective procedure for members to trade in the third
marlret, were attacked as a concerted refusal to deal in violation of the antitrust laws.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1968, at 67, col. 7. Rep. Emanuel Celler, Chairman of. the
House Judiciary Committee, has urged the Department of Justice to bring snit against
the NYSE to invalidate Rule 394, id., Dec. 11, 1968, at 3, col. 2, but the Justice
Department decided to wait until after the SEC hearings. Id., Jan. 8, 1969, at 2, col. 4.
In late 1964 the NYSE proposed a volume discount in a package deal which
also included a raise in commission rates and mandatory service fees to bring "about
the return of some of the business lost . . . to the third market.'~ ld., Dec. 31, 1964,
at 3, col. 1 (rematlrs of Keith Funston, former NYSE President). However, some members feared a rate war with the third market. The package deal was discarded because
the SEC demanded "full documentation" before implementing the rate increase. Jd. One
year later only the volume discount was still alive. ld., Jan. 3, 1966, at 4, col. l.
48 SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 5, at 140.
49 Wall St. Journal, June 28, 1968, at 3, col. 1.
50 /d., May 31, 1968, at 8, col 3; id., April 30, 1968, at 34, col. 1.
51 The SEC proposed interim measures include:
(I) the reduction of rates for that portion of an order involving round lots in
excess of 400 shares, and alternatively, to eliminate requirements for minimum
commissions for all orders in excess of $50,000.
(2) the implementation of appropriate reductions in the current intramember
rate for non-executing .firms or eliminate requirements for minimum intramember charges to such non-executing firms.
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8324 (May 28, 1968). The new schedule has
already caused commotion on Wall Street because "[i]t's believe [sic] commission income is nearly 20% below what the same transactions would have produced under
the old schedule." Wall St. Journal, Jan. 23, 1969, at 2, col. 3.
52 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8324 at 2 (May 28, 1968) (letter from
Manuel F. Cohen, SEC Chairman·, to Robert W. Haack, NYSE President).
53 Wall St. Journal, April 30, 1968, at 34, col. I.
54 The NYSE plan was a counterproposal to the one submitted by the SEC. Letter
from Robert W. Haack to Manuel F. Cohen, reprinted in CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.

668

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 55:661

count on transactions involving over 1000 shares, reduction in intra-member
rates, and the abolition of give-ups. 55 This retreat by the NYSE does not
represent an attempt to dilute the commission rate structure, but rather an
attempt to fortify that structure against an anticipated attack at the SEC
hearings. 5il
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS

The legality of the commission rate structure has been challenged on the
ground that it constitutes price fixing, a per se violation57 of section 1 of the
Sherman· Act. 58 In the leading case, 59 United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil
Co.,ilo a price fixing agreement was held to be illegal despite its reasonableness,61 and in United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards, 62
(Current vol.) '1177,599 at 83,279 (1968). The SEC accepted the plan, SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8399 (Aug. 30, 1968); the NYSE Board of Governors approved, Wall St. Journal, Oct. 11, 1968, at 3, col. 2; and the membership voted 925 to
266 to accept, id. Oct. 25, 1968, at 2, col. 3. The American Stock Exchange version
passed 316 to 206. ld., Nov. 4, 1968, at 6, col. 3. The NYSE has recently begun a
comprehensive study of the entire rate structure. This effort to formulate a permanent
schedule will last from 12 to 18 months and cost $400,000. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1969, at
65, col. 4.
55 See note 37 supra. As of January 2, 1968, the NYSE favored retention of give-ups
bur with a limitation on the "percentage amount which may be so given-up." SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 at 12 (Jan. 26, 1968) (letter from Robert W.
Haack, NYSE president, to Exchange members).
.
li6 "The question the Exchange must face is whether the continuance of give-up
practices will weaken the economic basis for minimum commissions." NYSE Special
Membership Bull., reprinted in CCH FEn. SEc. L. REP. (Current 'vol.) 'II 77,564 at
83,192 (I 968).
57 ATToRNEY GEN.'s NAT'L CoMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws, REPORT at 12
(1955).
58 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) makes illegal
[ e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations ....
For a general discussion of the applicability of the antitrust laws to the securities industry, see Asch, The Antitrust Laws and the Regulated Securities Mm·kets, 11 ANnTRUST BuLL. 209 (1966); Bides, Amitrust and the New YoTk Stock Exchange, 21 Bus.
LAw. 129 (1965); Johnson, Application of Antitrust Laws to the Securities Industry,
20 Sw. L.J. 536 (1966); Nerenberg, Applicability of the Antitrust Laws to the
Securities Field, 16 W. REs. L. REv. 131 (1964).
59 SEC Counnents on PTOposed Rule at 20 (comments of the Department of Justice).
60 310 u.s. 150 (1940).
ill 310 U.S. at 218; accord, United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392,
396-98 (1927); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 341-42
(1897). But see Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (standard
is "whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby
promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition"). See geneTally Bork & Bowman, Tbe Crisis in Antitrust, 65 CoLuM. L. REv.
363, 365 (1965); von Kalinowski, The Per Se DoctTine-An Emerging Philosophy of
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involving a plan comparable to the NYSE rate structure, the Supreme Court
held that the prescribing of standard commissions by a real estate board
was per se unlawful:
[A]n agreement, shown either by adherence to a price schedule or by
proof of consensual action fixing the uniform or minimum price, is
itself illegal under the Sherman Act, no matter what end it was designed to serve.'13
The courts have not deviated from this position in subsequent cases64 and
the NYSE has not contested this precedent; 65 instead, the Exchange relies
upon an implied exemption theory to immunize it from antitrust liability.

Antitrust Exemptions in General
Antitrust exemptions can be either express 66 or implied.;; 7 Such exemptions arise because in many areas Congress has shifted from the usual policy
of "prohibiting restraints on competition to one of providing relief from the
rigors of competition." 68 Because of the paramount importance attached
Antitrust Law, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 569 (1964); Loevinger, The Rule of Reason in
Antitrust Law, 7 PRAC. LAw. 17, 19-21 (Nov., 1961); Montague, "Per se lllegality" and
the Rule of Reason, 12 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 69 (1958).
The rationale of the per se doctrine is that some practices "because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the
precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use." Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 3_56 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
62 339 u.s. 485 (1950).
'1>BJd. at 489.
ll4 "Throughout the period under study [1955-1968], the courts have uniformly reiterated that horizontal price fixing arrangements are unlawful per se." ABA, 1955-1968
ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 2 (1968).
tl5 The NYSE memorandum submitted to the SEC during the recent hearings docs
not discuss price-fixing. NYSE, Memorandum of the NYSE before the SEC.
Commission Rate Structure of Registered National Exchanges, File No. 4-144, Aug ..
1968 [hereinafter cited as NYSE Memo.], -reprinted in CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
(Current vol.) ~ 77,587 (1968).
66 E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1964) (Capper-Volstead exemption for agricultural cooperatives); 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1964) (Webb-Pomerene exemption for producers export trade
associations); 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1964) (McCarren-Ferguson exemption for state regulation of insurance industry); 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964) (exempting labor, agricultural and
horticultural associations); 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1964) (exempting state supervision of
resale price maintenance).
t! 7 E.g., Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). For a comprehensive list of exemptions created by Congress and the courts up to 1961, see Pogue, The Rationale of
Exemptions from Antitrust, 19 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 313, 330-54 (1961).
6BFCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 92 (1953).
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to antitrust enforcement,'69 exemptions-both express and implied-are narrmvly construed.' 0 Express exemptions are limited on the theory that if
"Congress had desired to grant any further immunity, Congress doubtless
would have said so." 71 In dealing with implied exemptions, however, courts
have no easily discernable expression of congressional intent on which to
rely. The argument most frequently advanced in seeking an implied exemption is that Congress, by delegating authority to a regulatory agency, has
preempted the usual antitrust jurisdiction of the courts.' 2 But this argument
must overcome the strict standard that the Supreme Court has announced:
"Repeals of the antitrust laws by implication from a regulatory statute are
69 See Carnation Co. v. Pacific VVestbound Conf., 383 U.S. 213, 218 (1966) ("the
antitrust laws represent a fundamental national economic policy"); United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348 (1963) (antitrust policy serves a "felt
indispensable role . . . in the maintenance of a free economy"); Pan Am. VVorld
Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 324 (1963) (the Sherman Act "embodies perhaps the most basic economic policy of our society"); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v.
United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933) (the Sherman Act is a "charter of freedom"
comparable to constitutional provisions).
70 The Supreme Court has- repeatedly declined to hold that a congressionally enacted
regulatory scheme completely disphces the antitrust laws absent an unequivocally
declared congressional purpose to do so. See, e.g., California v. FPC, 369 U.S.
482, 485 (1962); cf. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959)
(Federal Communications Act held no bar to antitrust suit against TV and radio
licenses); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (Interstate Commerce
Act does not immunize railroads from prosecution for unfair rate fixing); Pan Am. \Vor!d
Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 304-05 (1963) (broad CAB jurisdiction over
unfair air trade practices does not preempt antitrust snits) (dictum). See also
ABA, 1955-1968 ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 189 (1968) (concluding that judicial interpretation has not substantially expanded any exemption); Orrick, The Recem Emsion
of CeTtain AntitTust Exemptiom, 10 ANTITRUST BuLL. 667 ( 1965).
The Court's approach to implied exemptions is analogous. Not only are they disfavored, see note 73 in[m, but their scope has been narrowly confined to conform
to the need asserted. See Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357-58
(1963).
For a criticism of recent Supreme Court cases applying the antitrust laws, see Merkel,
Tbe Ot!Je1· Ami of Antitmst, 46 HARY. Bus. REv. 53 (March-April 1968).
71 United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 201 (1939). The l\TYSE has attempted to
subvert this rationale by citing congressional inaction as proof that Congress intended
to exempt the Exchange from the antitrust laws: "If Congress had intended otherwise,
it would have said so." NYSE Memo. at 10,-?·epTinted in CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. (Current
val.) 9177,587 at 83,235 (1968).
72 See, e.g., Pan Am. ·vvorld Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962); United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334
(1959). For an analysis of an implied antitrust exemption in another context, see
Comment, Alabmna PoweT Company v. Alabama Electric Cooperative: RuTal ElectTificntion and tbe Antitrust LG'l.vs-lnesistible Fm·ce Meets 17llmovable Object, 55 VA. L.
REv. 325 (1969). See ge11eTally Hale & Hale, Competitiou or Comrol I: Tbe C!Jao.r iu
tbe Cases, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 641 (1958); Hale & Hale, Competitio-n or Control VI:
Application of AntitTwt Laws to Regulated Industries, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 46 (1962).
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strongly disfavored, and have only been found in cases of plain repugnancy
between the antitrust and regulatory provisions." 73
Subject to the general rule that exemptions will be narrowly construed,
there are twogrounds on which an implied exemption may be based. First,
an exemption may arise if an agency is responsible for enforcing some
"competitive stand4rd clearly delineated by [statute]." 74 Although the
Court ·Jrequently speaks of this type of exemption in terms of the "pervasiveness" 75 of agency regulation, extensive regulation by the Federal
Communications Commission and the Federal Power Commission has not
sufficed to provide an antitrust exemption. 76 In United States v. Radio
Corporation of Arnerica,17 an exchange of television stations was attacked
as. violative of the Sherman Act. 78 The Federal Communications Commission had consented to the transaction as required by section 310 (b) of the
Communication Act of 1934.79 RCA contended that this required approval vested the FCC with primary jurisdiction and that an attack could
be made only on direct review of the license grant. The Court rejected this
argument holding that the Commission lacked the statutory power to
resolve antitrust questions since its approval was based on a broad standard of "public interest, convenience, and necessity" 80 rather than on anti73 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-5I (1963). The principle
is a modification of the older, more general canon of construction that "repeals by
implication are not favored." United States v. Tynen, 78 U.S. (II Wall.) 88, 92
(1870) (dictum); see Henderson's Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 652, 657 (1870).
However, commentators have viewed the principle as less than sacred. Kestenbaum,
Primary Jurisdictimz to Decide Antitrust Jurisdiction: A Practical Approach to the
Allocation of Functions, 55 GEo. L.]. 812, 820 (1967) ("the rule is, indeed, that such
immunity will not be implied except when the Court thinl{s it ought to be."); 33 A.B.A.
ANTITRUST L.]. 5 (1967) ("there does not seem to be an incontestable principle that
every exemption must necessarily be interpreted narrowly").
74 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 351 (1963). Compare PaJ;J.
Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 37I U.S. 296 (1963), with California v. FPC,
3iS9 U.S. 482, 485 (I962) and United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S .. 334
(1959).
75 See, e.g., Hale & Hale, Me1·gers in Regulated Industries, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 49, 54
(1964) ("The hy word is 'pervasive.'").
76 There is doubt whether any regulatory scheme exists that is sufficiently "pervasive"
within the Court's definition to totally displace the antitrust laws. Set~ Johnson,
llpplication of Antitrust Laws to the Sec'qrities Industry, 20 Sw. L.J. 536, 553 & nn.II7-18
(I966). In United States v. Philadelphia Nat'] Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), the antitrust
laws were applied even though "[t]he regulation of banking may be more intensive
than the regulation of any other industry . . . ." I K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw
§ 4.04 at 247 (1958). The Court. itself remarked that "the agencies maintain virtually
a day-to-day surveillance of the American banking system." 374 U.S. at 329.
77 358
334 (1959).
7815 U.S.C. §§I, 4 (1964).
7947 U.S.C. § 3IO(b) (1964).
80 !d.

u.s.
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•trust criteria. 81 Similar reasoning was employed by the Court in California
v. Federal Po'l.ver Conmzission,8z where the Government attacked the
merger of a gas company with a pipeline company. After initiation of the
antitrust suit, the companies submitted an application for merger and re·ceived Power Commission approval pursuant to section 7 of the Natural
Gas Act. 88 In holding that the administrative decision should have been
suspended pending completion of the antitrust suit, the Court emphasized
.that the FPC lacked the statutory authority to adjudicate antitrust issues
and therefore could not preempt the Court's antitrust jurisdiction. 84
A comparison of these cases with the Court's decision in Pan American
TV mid Airrways, Inc. v. United Statess5 reveals that the requisite "pervasiveness" is not established merely by thorough regulation; in addition, there
musr be something "built into the regulatory scheme ·which performs the
antitrust function." 86 In Pan American the Court held that the Civil Aeronautics Board had exclusive jurisdiction over questions of injunctive relief
against the division of territories or allocation of routes among carriers. The
crucial factors in the Court's decision were the statutory delegation of responsibility to consider some antitrust factors,87 and the explicit provision for
81 In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied upon §§ 311, 313 of the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § § 311, 313 (1964 ), fomm·Jy 48 Stat. 1086-87 (1934). Section
311 directed the FCC to refuse to license a station whose Ecense had been previously
revoked by a court under § 313, which made the antitrust laws applicable to the
"manufacture and sale of and ... trade iri radio apparatus and devices . . . ." 358 U.S.
M 340 n.6.
82 369 u.s. 482 (1962).
83 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1964) (merger conditioned upon FPC certificate of "public
·convenience and necessity"). The Court indicated that while antitrust considerations
are "plainly relevant" under this standard, 369 U.S. at 484, this in itself did not
establish a "pervasive" regulatory scheme. ld. at 485.
M The Court noted that there was no express antitrust exemption for FPC-approved
mergers in the Natural Gas Act, nor would the Court interpret § 7 of the Clayton
Act: 15 U.S.C. § 18 0964), to include such an exemption." 369 U.S. at 486. This
construction is supported by § 20(a) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717s(a)
(1964), which advises the FPC to communicate "apparent violations of the Federal
antitrust laws to the Attorney General, who, in his discretion, may institute the
necessary criminal proceedings."
85 371 u.s. 296 (1963).
S6 Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 358 ( 1963).
87 371 U.S. at 304. The critical provisions of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.
H 1301-1542 (1964), were § 411, 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1964) (CAB jurisdiction over
"unfair methods of competition in air transportation"), and § § 408-409, 49 U.S.C.
§ § 1378-1379 (1964) (CAB authority over consolidations, mergers, purchasers, leases,
operating contracts, acquisition of control of an air carrier, and interlocking relations).
Furthermore, the enforcement of the Clayton Act as it applies to air carriers is vested
in the CAB, 15 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1964). In Pan AmeTican, ho-wever, the Court went
on to say that the CAB does not "have jurisdiction over every antitrust violation by
air carriers." 371 U.S. at 311-12.
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judicial review of these CAB determinations. 88 In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,B9 the absence of these two factors resulted in the conclusion that section 7 of the Clayton Act 90 was applicable to a bank merger
even after approval by the Comptroller of the Currency. 91 In holding that
the Comptroller lacked authority to enforce the antitrust laws, the Court
noted that although the Comptroller was required to consider the anticompetitive effects of a merger application, "he was not required to give
this factor any particular weight." 92 Furthennore, there was "no specific
provision for judicial review of his decision." 93 From the language in these
cases it would appear that both criteria-explicit statutory authority to consider antitrust variables and judicial review of the exercise of that authority
-are essential for an implied exemption based upon the "pervasiveness" of
agency regulation.
A second type of exemption from the antitrust laws may be implied
where such an exemption is necessary for the successful operation of a
regulatory scheme. Whereas an exemption based on "pervasiveness" extends
to the full scope of the agency's responsibility for providing nonjudicial
antitrust enforcement, the "necessity" exemption is recognized only to the
extent that it is essential to the effectuation of the regulatory statute. The
hallmark case raising the "necessity" inquiry is Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange. 94 Silver, a nonmember of the Exchange who engaged in overthe-counter trading, had received temporary NYSE approval of wire connections with member firms. When these connections were later severed as
"required by the Exchange's Constitution and rules," 95 Silver charged that
the ex parte termination constituted a collective refusal to deal in violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 96 The district court held that the antitrust laws were applicable to the NYSE action because the termination of
the wire connections went beyond the scope of NYSE's power granted by
the Exchange Act. 97 Reversing this decision, the Second Circuit con49 u.s.c. § 1486 (1964).
374 U.S. 321 (1963); accord, United States v. First Nat'! Bank & Trust Co., 376
U.S. 665 (1964).
90 15 u.s.c. § 18 (1964).
Ill The Comptroller General had approved the merger pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 215
(1%4). Under the Bank Merger Act of 1960, 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (c) (1964), such approval is conditioned upon the receipt of reports by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Attorney
General. All three reports concluded that the "merger would have substantial anticompetitive effects ...." 374 U.S. at 333.
92 374 U.S. at 351.
93 /d.
94 373 u.s. 341 (1963).
95 /d. at 344.
96J5 U.S.C. §I (1964).
97196 F. Supp. 209, 221-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), rev'd, 302 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd,
88

89
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strued the Exchange Act as comprehending such activity 98 and allowed an
exemption.99 The Supreme Court declined to follow the rationale of either
of the lower courts_l<1{) Instead, the Court declared that in the absence
of the Exchange Act the severance of the wires would "constitute a peT se
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act," 101 but then concluded that the rule
applied by the NYSE was "germane" 102 ,to its statutory duty of selfregulationHl3 and therefore within the scope of the Exchange Act. The
Court recognized that the issue raised by the NYSE action was "the extent
to which the character and objectives of the duty of exchange self-regulation
contemplated by the Securities Exchange Act are incompatible with the
maintenance of an antitrust action." W 4 Nevertheless, this ultimate issue
was avoided by the Court's decision that the NYSE had exceeded its authority under the Act by severing Silver's wire connections without notice,
explanation or an opportunity for a hearing, 105 and in so doing had failed
to reach the "threshold of justification." 1{)6 The Court did state, however,
that the test for resolving conflicts between antitrust and regulatory statutes
is the necessity of an antitrust exemption:
Repeal is to be regarded as implied only if necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and even then only to the minimum extent
necessary .107
Application of the Antitmst Laws to the Commission Rate Structure

The Silver case was purportedly applied in Kaplan v. Leh111an BTothen/ 08
373 U.S. 341 (1963) (although the district court's disposition was reinstated, the Supreme
Court relied on different grounds)._
98 302 F.2d 714 (2d Cir.1962), rev'd, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
99 "The Exchange is exempt ... because it is exercising a power which it is required
to exercise by the Securities Exchange Act." 302 F.2d at 721.
1oo 373 U.S. at 356-57.
101/d. at 347, citing Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Colee Co., 364
U.S. 656 (1961); IGor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion
Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). For a discussion see
Barber, Refusals to Deal Under tbe Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 847
(1955); Rahl, Per Se Rules and Boycotts under the Sherman Act: Some Reflections on
the !(lor's Case, 45 VA. L. REv. 1165 (1959).
1o2 373 U.S. at 356.
103 This was implied by interpreting §§ 6(b), 6(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78f(b), (d) (1964), to include a duty to regulate members' transactions and relationships with nonmembers.
104 373 U.S. at 358.
105/d. at 361-62.
106Jd. at 365.
107 !d. at 357.
lOB 250 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ill. 1966), aff'd, 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 3H<J
U.S.954 (1967).
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a class action and shareholder's derivative suit directly challenging the commission rate structure as violating section 1 of the Sherman Act. The district
judge granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on two grounds:
First, the complaint alleged a per se violation, 109 and Silver had held that
action taken by the Exchange' pursuant to its statutory rule-making authority
could not be per se illegal under the Sherman Act.l 10 Even assuming that
rhe district court was correct in :finding that the Exchange Act "by the
plainest implication" m vests the NYSE with authority to :fix minimum
rates, this ground could easily be obviated by drafting pleadings which did
not rely on the per se argument. 112 Furthermore, SilveT explicitly stated that
:finding an exception to the per se theory was "only the beginning, not the
end, of inquiry." na
Second, the district court decided that SEC authorization to alter or supplement NYSE rules preempted antitrust jurisdiction.ll 4 The court founded
this argument on dictum in the majority opinion in SilveT; after emphasizing
that there was no statutory provision for agency or judicial review of the
Exchange's termination of Silver's wire connections, Mr. Justice Goldberg
observed that "[s]hould review of .exchange self-regulation be provided
through a vehicle other than the antitrust laws, a different case as to antitrust exemption would be presented." m The SilveT opinion specifically
noted that this was "an issue we do not decide today." 116 Furthermore, the
Kaplan conclusion does not follow inevitably from the dictum on which
the court relies; Silver never said that such a "different case" would necessitate a different result. The context of Mr. Justice Goldberg's 'remarks suggests that the other vehicle inherent in the regulatory scheme may have to
protect the same competitive policies that are embodied in the antitrust
laws. 117 At a minimum, Kaplan should have recognized that the Supreme
Court's language invites some appraisal of the efficacy of the other vehicle
in protecting the public interest against the Exchange's abuse of its selfregulatory powers.U 8 In sum, the Kaplan opinion inadequately deals with
109 250 F. Supp. at 564.
110

373 U.S. at 348-49.

111250 F. Supp. at 565.
112 The Department of Justice has apparently taken tllis approach. See SEC Comments on Proposed Rule at 18 n.3.
113 373 U.S. at 349.
114 250 F. Supp. at 565-66.
115 373 U.S. at 360.
Wl]d. at 358 n.l2.
117 "Applicability of the antitrust laws, therefore, rests on the need for vindication
of their positive aim of insuring competitive freedom. Denial of their applicability
would defeat the congressional policy reflected in· the antitrust laws without serving
the policy of Securities Exchange Act." ld. at 360.
11 8 Chief Justice Warren, dissenting from the majority's denial of certiorari in
Kaplan, called the Court of Appeals' opinion "blunderbuss" and "scanty." 389 U.S. at
957.
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the complex and i.rnporta..Tlt antitrust issues raised by the NYSE commission
rate structure, and the Supreme Court's denjal of certiorari merely means
that these issues have yet to be settled.l19 Accordingly, there must be a full
analysis of the three legal bases that may be asserted to justify the Exchange's long-established practice of fixing minimum commission rates:
( 1) implied congressional authorization of rate-fixing as an essential part
of the Exchange's self-regulatory function, 120 (2) the displacement of normal judicial antitrust jurisdiction because of the "pervasiveness" of SEC
regulation under the Exchange Act, 121 and (3) the "necessiry" of minimum
rates to implement the policies of the Act.

The Commission Rate Structure and the Self-Regulatory System
Under the self-regulatory concept embodied in the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 122 the exchanges are not only the objects of supervision by the
SEC but also exercise regulatory powers over their own members. As
pointed out in the Senate Report accompanying the Exchange Act bill,
the initiative and responsibility for promulgating regulations pertaining
to the administration of their ordinary affairs remain with the exchanges themselves. It is only where they fail adequately to provide
protection to investors that the Commission is authorized to step in and
compel them to do so. 123
119 The Kaplctn opinion has not dissuaded the Department of Justice, see note 112
supra.
120 The "implied congressional authorization" argument is a modification of the "express exemption" rationale. See note 71 supra and accompanying text. In essence, the
NYSE contends that § 19(b) of the Exchange Act, which provides for SEC review of
Exchange rules pertaining to "the fixing of reasonable rates of commission," impliedly
authorizes the exchanges to fix their own rates free from the antitrust laws.
121 Relying in part upon the Supreme Court's dictum in Silve1·, see text at note 159
infra, the I'~YSE dues nut specifically argue that the regulatory scheme established by the
Exchange Act is sufficiently "pervasive" to confer a total exemption upon the Exchange. This issue is nevertheless important not only because the Court's conclusion
is dictum and not necessarily controlling but also because the "pervasiveness" inquiry is essential to a complete legal analysis of an implied antitrust exemption.
1 22 Former SEC Chairman Douglas graphically described self-regulation as "letting
the exchanges take t.he leadership with Government playing a residual role. Government would keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled,
cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would never have to be used." vV. DouGLAs,
DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82, (Allen ed. 1940).
1 23 S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934). This "partnership between government and private enterprise," Silver v. New York Stoclc Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 366
(1963), was originally a compromise necessitated by the sheer magnitude of such a regulatory task, see Hearings on Stock Excbange Practices Bef01·e tbe Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 6582 (1934); the bitter opposition
of the financial community, see 2 A. ScHLESJNGER, THE AGE OF RoosEVELT, Trm CoMJNG
oF THE NEw DEAL 463 (1959); and the tradition of Exchange self-regulation itself, see
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The Act's self-regulatory provisions require the exchanges to register
with the SEC, 124 :file copies of their rules, 125 satisfy the SEC that their rules
are "just and adequate to insure fair dealing and to protect investors," 126
provide sanctions against rule violations,I 27 and agree to enforce the rules.l2 8
The statute permits an exchange, once registered, to adopt new rules without prior SEC approval,l 211 but the Exchange must :file amendments with the
SEC.130
The SEC has direct regulatory authority over several matters, including
floor trading,l 31 specialists and odd-lot dealers, 132 short sales,I33 and manipulative or deceptive devices.l34 There is no provision for SEC review of exchange rule enforcement in particular instances, 135 an omission which led
to the Court's intervention in Silver. 136 Nor does the SEC have power to
penalize members for violating exchange rules. 137 The SEC does, however,
have power to request changes in exchange rules in a wide range of areas.
Section 19(b) authorizes the Commission to request changes in the rules,
and if, after an opportunity for a hearing the exchange refuses, the SEC
may order changes that are
necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors or to insure
fair dealing in securities traded in upon such exchange or to insure
fair administration of such exchange ... in respect of such matters as
Westwood & Howard, Self-Government in the Securities Business, 17 LAW & CoNTEMP.
PRoB. 518, 518-22 (1953). But cf. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73 Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934)
(emphasizing the failure of private exchange controls).
12415 U.S.C. § 78e (1964).
125 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (1964).
12s15 D.S.C. § 78f(d) (1964).
127 15 U.S.C. § 78f (b) (1964) (rules must include provisions for expulsion, suspension, or
disciplinary action against member conduct "inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade ....").
12s15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (1) (1964).
121l15 U.S.C. § 78f(c) (1964).
13015 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (4) (1964).
13115 U.S.C. § 78k(a) (1964).
13215 U.S.C. § 78k(b) (1964).
l.3.'l15 U.S.C. § 78j(a) (1964).
13415 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j(b) (1964).
135 2 L. Loss, SEcUIUTIES REGULATION 1178 (2d ed. 1961).
136 373 U.S. at 357.
137 SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 4, at 704. When an investigation discloses possible violations,
the SEC usually refers the case to the particular exchange. If the exchange takes
no action, the Commission can then suspend or revoke the exchange's registration
under § 19(a) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a) (1) (1%4), for a violation of its continuing
duty to enforce its rules and regulations. L. Loss, supra note 135, at 1178; see Baird v.
Franldin, 141 F.2d 238, 244 (2d Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737
(1944).
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(9) the fixing of reasonable rates of commission, interest, listing,
and other charges ... and ( 13) similar matters.l 38
From this section the NYSE concludes that Congress impliedly authorized
the Exchange to fix minimum commission rates subject to SEC review as
an essential part of its self-regulatory function. 139 However, this contention
fails upon closer scrutiny of the Act itself, its legislative history, and its
imple~entation by the SEC.
The list of items subject to SEC review under section 19(b) is illustrative
rather than exclusive_H<l Unless the enumerated items and all "similar matters" are assumed to be indispensable parts of the self-regulatory system, the
purpose of the provision must be to explain the general scope of SEC review
rather than insulate all exchange rules from antitrust remedies. Even if some
kind of rate-fixing were justified, section 19(b) nowhere suggests that a
minimum schedule of rates is necessary. That section only empowers the
SEC to alter or supplement exchange rules regarding the fixing of reasonable
rates, which arguably may .include minimum, maximum or even negotiated
rates.H 1 Moreover, when Congress has desired to prescribe minimum rates
in other fields, it has so specified.H2 Here Congress not only failed to
specifically authorize minimum rates, but on the contrary, employed a
reasonableness standard which is ambiguous in a rate-fixing contextY 3
138 15 U .S.C. § 78s (b) (1964). The Court has concluded that this section impliedly
gives the SEC power to "disapprove any rules adopted by an exchange . . . ." Silver
v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
I39The Exchange also relies upon§ 3(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(3) (1964), which
defines a member of an exchange as one who "is permitted . . . to effect transactions
on the exchange ... with the payment of a commission or fee which is less than that
charged the general public . . . ." The contention is that only by the fixing of a
uniform minimum commission rate can a "yardstick" be established with which to
determine if the fee to the general public exceeds the member fee. NYSE Memo. at
7, TepTimed in CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. (Current vol.) ~ 77,587 at 83,234 (1968). The
Department of Justice characterizes the clause merely as an alternative condition to
exchange membership which becomes inoperative when members can no longer be
serviced at lower costs. It is neither inconsistent with a competitive rate system nor
indicative of a congressional intent to impliedly repeal the antitrust laws. Justice
Dep't Memo. at 30-31.
140 Justice Dep't Memo. at 23.
141 "(M]any of the knottiest problems of rate structure and establishment of
'reasonable' rates . . . might be enormously simplified if 'reasonable' rates were not
necessarily conceived of as minimum ones.'" SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 323. See id., pt. 5,
at 106-07 (recommending a maximum-minimum schedule); Nerenberg, Applicability of
tbe Amitmst Lwws to t be Securities Field, 16 VV. REs. L. REv. 131, 150-51 (1964).
H2 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §§ 13 (4), 15(1), 316(e), 318 (1964) (ICC power to set
"maximum and minimum" rates for rail, water, and motor carriers); 49 U.S.C.
§ 1482 (i) (1964) (CAB authorized to Ji, "maximum and minimum" rates for air carriers); 47 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1964) (FCC power to set "maximum and minimum" rates for
wire and radio).
H3 See text at note 167 infTa. 'Vhile the NYSE stresses that the "experience of
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Since the referen~es to legislative history cited by the NYSE as authorizing minimum rates are not drawn from a comprehensive discussion of the
rate structure, 144 they are unconvincing in establishing any legislative intent.145 Some of these references allude not to the NYSE but to the Federal
Trade Commission rate-fixing that was proposed in the original draft, 146 and
in three other cases appear to contemplate maximum, not minimum, rates. 147
The existence of only eight such references 148 in· the volu_minous, multithe Exchange and the expertise of the SEC accumulated in applying the statutory
standard of reasonableness" evidences an implied authority to fix minimum rates,
NYSE Memo. at 27, reprinted in CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. (Current vol.) ~ 77,587 at
83,243 (1968), the Special Study concludes that this standard has been without "comprehensive and consistent public articulation, on the part of the Exchange or the Commission." SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 343.
144 For general descriptions of the background of the enactment of the Exchange Act
of 1934, see 2 A. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF RooSEVELT, THE CoMING oF THE NEw DEAL
ch. 29 (1959); Gadsby, Historical Developments of tbe SE.C.-Tbe Government View,
28 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 6 (1959); Tracy and MacChesney, Tbe Securities Excbange Act
of 1934, 32 MICH. L. REv. 1025, 1033-36 (1934).
145 An early draft of the Exchange Act contained the phrase "uniform rate" rather
than "reasonable rate." H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). During the hearings
on the bill, it was suggested that "uniform" be deleted:
While . . . your bill would give the Federal Trade Commission the right to
prescribe uniform rates of commission, it does not otherwise authorize the
Commission to fix rates, which it seems to me it should do and would do by
striking out the word "uniform." That would permit the Commission to fix
rates . . . . [T]he commissions charged should either be fixed by some governmental authority or be supervised by such an authority. As matters now stand,
the exchange can charge all that the traffic will bear, and that is a burden
upon commerce.
Hearings on Stock Excbange Practices Before tbe Senate Cmmn. on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 16, at 7705 (1934). The NYSE concludes that the
deletion was to authorize the Federal Trade Commission to fix rates, which historically
means fix minimum rates. NYSE Memo. at 10, reprinted in CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
(Current vol.) ~ 77,587 at 83,235. The Department of Justice cites the passage to
demonstrate the breadth of the SEC's powers and the policy of protecting investors
from excessive rates. Justice Dep't Memo. at 27. However, the Special Study reports
that no formal explanation was given for the change, SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 300.
One commentator has inferred from the deletion that Congress did not intend to
exempt commission rates from the antitrust laws. 19 W. REs. L. REv. 167, 170 n.21 (1967).
But see Note, Antitrust and tbe Stock Excbange: MininzU11z Commission or Free Competition?, 18 STAN. L. REv. 213,225 (1965). See also Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 17
n.26, Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 954 (1967).
146 S. 2683 & H.R. 7853, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
147 Justice Dep't Memo. at 28, citing 78 CoNG. REc. 8303 (1934) (remarks of Rep.
Pettengill); id. at 8091-92 (remarks of Rep. Wadsworth); id. at 8490 (remarks of Sen.
Hastings).
148 Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before tbe Senate Cmmn. on Banking a'nd
Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 13, at 6075, 6080 (1934); Hearings on H.R. 7852
and HR. 8720 Before tbe House Comm. on Interstate· and Foreign Commerce, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., 320-21, 423-24 (1934); 78 CoNG. REc. 8087, 8092, 8490, 8493 (1934).
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volume hearings 1 .10 and extensive debates, 150 and no mention whatsoever
of minimum rates in the committee 151 and conference 152 reports, also undercuts the NYSE's argument that the fixing of minimum rates was considered
part of the self-regulatory system of the Exchange Act.
Because administrative activities pmsuant to the regulatory statute that
created the agency are helpful in interpreting ambiguous legislative directives/53 the history of the SEC's use of section 19(b) as a regulatory tool is
significant. If it could be shown that the SEC carefully scrutinized changes
in the NYSE commission rate structure, then perhaps the argument that
Congress intended the Exchange to set minimum rates subject to SEC review
would be persuasive. On the contrary, however, the Commission's role in
reviewing previous rate .increases154 has been little more than passive. 15 ~>
Although the SEC can force the Exchange to abandon .its minimum commission rates under its general power to request changes in the NYSE's rules,
the Commission has no procedure for regular or systematic review of the
Exchange's rules; 156 indeed, its power under section 19(b) has been used
only once in the history of the SEC, and then in an area other than commission rates.w;

Exemption Based on "Pervasiveness"
Since the Exchange Act does not expressly provide for an antitrust exemption, the pattern of regulation under the Act must be examined to determine
whether SEC and Exchange activities impliedly exempt the 1--JYSE commission rate structure from the antitrust laws. According to the Court,
The Senate hearings alone include twenty parts and over 9,000 pages of testimony.
See 2 L. Loss, SEcURITIES REGULATION 784 n.2 (2d ed. 1961).
151 H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26 (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d'
Con g., 2d Sess. 13 (1934). Both reports refer generally to the SEC's powers under
§ 19 (b) '\Vith no mention of rate-fixing.
152 H. R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
1G3 See Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec. liVorlcers, 367 U.S ..
396, 408 (1961); Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315
(1933); United States v. Jackson, 280 U.S.183, 193 (1930).
15"1 There were increases in 1938, 1942, 1947, 1953, and 1958. For a brief dis-cussion of the circumstances surrounding these rate increases, see SPECIAL STUDY,
pt. 2, at 328-33, 344-45.
155 The SEC did not even complete its review of the 1958 rate increases until several:
months after the increases took effect. Id., pt. 2, at 332. This inaction has not gone
uncriticized. See id., pt. 4, at 719; Jennings, Tbe New York Stock Excbange and the
Cmmnission Rate Struggle, 53 'CALIF. L. REv. 1119,1144 n.86 (1965); Johnson, Applicationof Antitrust Laws to tbe Securities Industry, 20 Sw. L.J. 536 (1966); Note, Antitrust
and the Stock E:r:chrmge: .Minimum Commission or Free Competition?, 18 STAN. L. REv.
213,235 (1965).
15£ SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 4, at 712.
157 ld., pt. 2, at 344. For the one case where the SEC invalidated an Exchange rule ...
see note 27 mp1·a.
14il
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the first implied exemption inquiry is whether the regulatory scheme established by the Exchange Act is sufficiently "pervasive." 158 Although the
dictum in Silver broadly states that the self-regulatory scheme in· the
Exchange Act is not "pervasive" enough to create a total exemption,I 5ll the
Court was there dealing with an Exchange rule insulated from SEC review.
The Court specifically avoided the issue of whether review through a
vehicle other that the antitrust laws could confer a total exemption. 160 This
reservation suggests that it is at least possible that direct supervision of the
NYSE by the SEC, regardless of the breadth of the Commission's regulatory
power, is enough in some contexts to confer an exemption. But whether
the SEC's supervision over "the fixing of reasonable rates of commission" is
one of those contexts is the continuing controversy.
The SEC recognizes that "where the Commission has jurisdiction to review and pass upon particular Exchange activities, as it has in the area of
commission rates under Section 19(b) ... , antitrust immunity may, under
some circumstances, be implied." 161 On the other hand, the SEC acknowledges that such an exemption "necessarily contemplates that full consideration be given to the policies of the antitrust laws ... in evaluating any
aspect of the commission rate structure or any proposals for its revision." 162
However, unless the SEC has been delegated antitrust responsibilities coextensive with its review power, there is still "nothing built into the regulatory scheme which performs the antitrust function," 163 and mere agency
approval or review of private activity pursuant to broad statutory standards
has rarely been sufficient justification for an exemption. 164 Therefore, the
existence of SEC review of the "fixing of reasonable rates" does not present
a "different case as to antitrust exemption" 165 from that examined in Silver;
lliB

Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 34I, 347 (1963).

373 U.S. at 360-61.
160 See text at note II5-16 supra.

15ll

161 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 at 1-2 <Jan. 26, I968) (emphasis
added). Following this reasoning, the SEC in 1965 suggested an extension of its authority
over the Exchange coupled with an antitrust exemption. II I CoNG. REc. I 90I 9-22 (I 965)
{letter from Manuel F. Cohen, SEC Chairman, to Sen. A. Willis Robertson, Chairman of
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency). However, the proposal met stiff congressional opposition. See N.Y. Times, Aug. I9, 1965, at 37, col. 6-7 {letter from Rep.
Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, to the SEC vigorously opposing any antitrust inlrnunity for the NYSE); id., Sept. 8, 1965, at 63, col. 3 (Sen. Philip·
Hart opposing any Exchange exemption).
162 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8329 at 2 (Jan. 26, 1968); see II 1 CoNa_
REc. I9021 (1965) (remarl{s of Manuel F. Cohen, SEC Chairman).
163 Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 34I, 358 (1963).
164 Compare California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (I962) and United States v. Radio
Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959), with Pan. Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United
States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
165 Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 34 I, 360 (I 963).
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instead, the reqmsite "pervasiveness" still depends upon the scope of the
SEC's power to consider antitrust variables.
While section 19(b) does provide for Commission review of "reasonable
rates," it does not limit the SEC's power nor delegate the antitrust function
to the SEC by providing standards comparable to antitrust criteria. Unlike
the Federal Aviation Act standards which the Court relied on in the Pan
American case, 166 the standard of reasonableness in section 1'9(b) scarcely
constitutes a mandate to apply antitrust principles. The Supreme Court has
expressed doubt concerning the reliability of reasonableness in this context
by remarking that "neither law nor economics has yet devised generally
accepted. standards for the evaluation of rate-making orders.... " 167
The absence of antitrust language in the Exchange Act takes on special
significance when viewed in the light of the Act's other provisions. In the
first place, the Act preserves all existing rights and remedies. 168 This presumably includes antitrust rights under the Sherman Act, and hence is
indicative of an intent not to exempt the Exchange activities from antitrust
considerations by implication. Secondly, in passing other securities laws,
Congress has expressly provided review standards comparable to antitrust
criteria where it intended an antitrust exemption. The Maloney Act, 169 a
1938 amendment to the Exchange Act, requires the registration of national
associations of over-the-counter securities dealers, and expressly exempts
these associations from the application of any conflicting laws,ml but con166 See note 87 supra.
167/n re Permian Basin Area Rate, 390 U.S. 747,790 (1968) (dictum).
Hls "The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any
and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity . . ." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(a) (1964). Cf. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)
(dictum).
16915 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1964). For discussion of the operative features of the Maloney
Act, see Frey, Federal ,Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Securities Arlarket, 106
U. PA. L. REv. 1, 43-45 (1957); Westwood & Howard, Self-Gocvemment in the Secw:ities Business, 17 LAw & CoNTEMP. PnoB. 518, 518-25 (1952); Note, Tbe N ASDAn Unique Experiment in Cooperative Regulation, 46 VA. L. REv. 1586, 1587-89
(1960); Note, OveT-tbe-Counter Tmding and the Maloney Act, 48 YALE L. J. 633
(1939).
.
170 "If any provision of this section is in conflict with any provision of any law
of the United States in force on June 25, 1938, the provision of this section shall
prevail." 15 V.S.C. § 78o-3(n) (1964). This. section has been interpreted as an ·explicit
exemption for the over-the-counter dealers. See International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Street, 367 U.S. 740, 809-10 n.l6 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 227 n.60 (1940); National Ass'n of Securities
Dealers, Inc., 19 S.E.C. 424, 478 n.9 (1945). Some commentators have tried to explicate the difference in congressional treatment of over~the-counter dealers and the
exchange members by theorizing that the Maloney Act was needed as an incentive to
join national securities associations, whereas none were needed to bolster exchange
membership. \iVestwood & Howard, supra note 169, at 528; SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 4,
at 502-03.
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ditions their registration with the SEC on the promulgation of rules which
provide safeguards against unreasonable profits or unreasonable rates of
commissions . . . [and] remove impediments to and perfect the
mechanism of a free and open market; and are not designed to permit
unfair discrimination between customers or issuers, or brokers or
dealers, to fix minimum profits, to impose any schedule. of prices, or to
impose any schedule or fix minimum rates of commissions, allowances,
discounts, or other charges. 171
·
Both the exemption language and the antitrust standards manifest a congressional intent to insulate national securities associations from the antitrust laws, while the Exchange Act's regulation of the NYSE and other
organized securities exchanges is devoid of either type of exempting provision. Lastly, even if the reasonableness standard encompasses antitrust considerations, the Act is too vague to warrant an antitrust exemption. It not
only fails to specify how much weight the SEC should give to antitrust
criteria 172 but also neglects to require that the SEC apply the reasonableness
standard to all NYSE rules. The SEC's discretion in these matters is reflected in the fact that SEC powers under section 19(b) have "been formally
employed only once in the Commission's history, and then in an area other
than commission rates." 173 In sum, an antitrust. exemption for the commission rate structure can hardly be based on the "pervasiveness" of a regulatory scheme which embodies an inadequate and amorphous standard that
neither need be nor is applied with any degree of certainty.

Exemption Based on "Necessity"
Since the Exchange Act neither specifically authorizes the NYSE minimum rate structure nor establishes a "pervasive" system of SEC supervision
and Exchange self-regulation, the rate structure's immunization from the
antitrust laws depends upon its necessity to fulfill the principal policies of
the Exchange Act-the maintenance of a strong centralized securities market
and the protection of investors. 174 It is not within the scope or competence
of this Note to resolve the complex economic issues surrounding the impact of the minimum rate structure upon the objectives of the Exchange
Act; indeed, "no one can be absolutely certain of the consequences of
171 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (b) (7) (1964). The NYSE emphasizes that this section specifically
prohibits minimum commission rates while no such provision appears in the Exchange
Act. NYSE Memo. at 8, reprinted in CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. (Current vol.) ~ 77,587 at
83,234 n.2 (1968).
172 See text at note 92 supra.
173 SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 344. For the one case where the SEC invalidated an
Exchange rule, see note 27 supra.
174 SEC Comments on Proposed Rule at 20.
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abolishing mi11imum commission rates . . . " 175 However, the areas of
disagreement between the NYSE and the Justice Department can be delineated and the dispositive factual issues put into proper perspective in order
to determine how the disagreement might best be settled.
The NYSE argues that the elimination of minimum commissions would
have three major adverse effects upon the securities market: ( 1) dampen
the incentives for Exchange memb;rsJ-.ip, thereby turr1ing the NYSE into
an association of floor brokers and undermining its function as a central
auction market, ( 2) produce destructive competition which would bankrupt
smaller commission-oriented brokerage firms, and (3) lead to discriminatory
pricing.

Central Auction Market.-The NYSE contends that in the absence of
preferential member rates, member firms would withdra-w from the Exchange in order to cross mders in their own offices, trade on the third
market, or negotiate directly with NYSE floor brokers, whichever would
be the most profitable.m; The impact of this membership decline would be
severe. There would be an inevitable loss of liquidity in the auction market,
and the ensuing inability of the Exchange to absorb considerable volumes
of demand and supply would produce greater price fluctuations, leaving the
broker unsure of obtaining a sales price reasonably close to the price of the
previously traded shareP 7 Consequently, brokers would exert diligent
efforts to secure the most favorable prices only on behalf of their large institutional accounts, not the small investors. 178 V\lith the erosion of the
NYSE as a central auction market, the small investor also would lose other
benefits of the Exchange, such as the "detailed, continuous record of transactions," 179 and the imposition of "rigorous standards of disclosure" 180 upon
listed companies. Furthermore, by withdrawing from the Exchange,
brokerage firms would avoid the extensive self-regulation and surveillance
175 THE NEw YoRK STocK ExcHANGE, F..EPORT oN nm EcoNOM!C EFFECTS OF NE•GOTIAmo CoMMISSION RAms ON THE BRoKERAGE INDUSTRY, THE MARKET FOR CoRPoRAm
SEcURITIES AND nm INVESTING Punuc 1 (August, 1968) [hereinafter cited as NYSE
EcoNOMIC REP.]; acc01·d, THE Busil'.'ESS LAWYER, Nov., 1965 at 182 ("You can't quite
predict what would happen") (remarks of Phillip A. Loomis, Jr., General Counsel of
the SEC).
17~ NYSE EcoNOMIC REP. at 23. The :Hrms most likely to withdraw from Exchange
membership are the brokers who do business exclusively with the public investor and
rely upon other members for the floor execution and clearance of these transactions.
At present there are 134 of these bro]cers accounting for 10% of the total securities
commission income. ld. To remain competitive, the integrated firms who do execute
and clear their own orders would then "split into two separate entities, one handling
public business, the other floor business," with only the former withdrawing. ld. at 25.
rn ld. at 14-16.
I78Jd. at 37.
17D !d. at 39.
180 ld. at 41.
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envisioned by the Exchange Act, 181 thereby putting "the immense burden
of regulating that portion of the industry which had previously been subject
to Exchange regulation ... upon the SEC, which is not presently equipped
to discharge such a burden." 182
The Department of Justice, on the other hand, argues that the maintenance of a centralized market does not depend on artificial incentives such
as high corrnnission rates; rather, "the economic pressure for efficient trading
will itself assure the centralized market." 183 Since execution and clearance
on the Exchange floor would be less costly and time-consuming than trading
within a single firm, large scale office crosses would be abandoned.UH Moreover, lower commissions produced by a competitive system would strengthen
the NYSE by stimulating business and recapturing some of the trading lost
to the third market. 185 As for the disincentives produced by the costs of
self-policing, the incremental costs of Exchange self-regulation over other
forms of regulation-National Association of Securities Dealers, SEC or
broker self-imposed regulation-are negligible and therefore not a deterrent
factor. 186 However, even if a significant number of members threatened
to withdraw from the Exchange, the Justice Department suggests more
workable alternatives than rate-fixing to preserve a centralized market.
Either the standard of regulation applicable to nonmembers could be raised,1 87
or increased NYSE membership could be fostered by requiring the membership of all brokerage fi1ms that do a minimum business in listed securities.188 Accordingly, membership would no longer be governed by the
highest bid for a seat, but by meeting established qualifications. 189

Destructive Competition.-In those industries characterized by high fixed
costs, destructive competition occurs when competitive pricing drives prices
toward an incremental out-of-pocket cost level lower than the average unit
cost, 1110 thereby "eroding the capital base needed for operations in the public
interest." 191 It is particularly prevalent during periods of poor business and
excess capacity because in the short-run it is better to minimize losses by
producing at the marginal cost level than to stop production comp1etely. 192
I81Jd. at 26.

182 NYSE Memo. at 20, reprinted in CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. (Current vol.) ~177,587
at83,240 (1968).
183 Justice Dep't Memo. at 53.
184Jd. at 60-61.
185Jd. at 46.
186 1d. at 66.
187 /d. at 176.
188Jd. at 177-78.
189/d. at 178.
190 NYSE EcoNoMIC REP. at 50.
191 Justice Dep't Memo. at 108.
1 ll2 NYSE EcoNOMic REP. at 51; see P. SAMUELSON, EcoNOMics: AN INTRODUCTORY
ANALYSIS 454-55 (6th ed. 1964).
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Although the function of the competitive price mechanism is to allocate
society's resources most efficiently by driving useless capacity from the
market, 193 the NYSE argues that excess capacity during slack times must be
tolerated in order to satisfy greater demands during peak business activity,
particularly since the securities industry is subject to huge volume fluctuations.194 Furthermore, the Exchange stresses that since the larger brokerage
houses derive substantial income from their undeP.vriti..Tlg activities, the
victims of destructive competition would not necessarily be the most inefficient firms; diversified firms could withstand a drop in rates, whereas the
"firms which are heavily commission-oriented would be the ones forced to
leave the field." 195
The Department of Justice refutes the J'.:YYSE's forecast of economic
disaster by challenging the application of a destructive competition model
to the securities industry. First, fixed costs in brokerage firms, especially
office space, manpower, and data processing equipment, while high, are not
immobile; these facilities can be productive in operations other than the
commission business, such as over-the-counter trading or managing mutual
fund shares. 196 Second, the diversity in both the size of brokerage firms
and the type of their activities evidences the lack of potential economies of
scale 197 that would lead to a significant concentration of brokers under
competitive pricing. 198 Finally, the need for excess capacity to handle peak
business loads is illusory; excess capacity to meet increased demand during
short-run fluctuations, siu.t.il~r to seasonal variations in other industries, is
considered in ordinary "entrepreneurial decisions." 199 More important,
however, is the fact that minimum rates alone do not insure adequate facilities to meet the trading demand. Despite unparalleled prosperity in the
past, the industry has not yet developed capacity sufficient to handle
average trading volume. 200 If the brokerage firms were com'peting with
each other, perhaps they would be forced to invest more of their profits in
these needed facilities.~·ol The Justice Departn1ent further argues that even
if competitive rates do result in the insolvency of some firms, rate-fixing is
SeeP. SAMUELSON, .mpTa note 192, at 67-68.
NYSE EcoNOMIC REP. at 52.
1D5Jd.at75.
196 Justice Dep't j\llerno. at 113-21.
197 "In economic terms, [economies of scale] exist if average costs per unit of output
decline with an increase in the size of the firm." I d. at 121.
198 ]d. at 121-32.
199/d. at 135, quoting C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST PoLICY 197 (1959). The
Department of Justice contends that in the securities industry "as in other industries, normal profit levels would sustain 'peak load' capacities needed for normal
business." /d. at 136.
2oo ]d. at 134.
201 Jd.
193

194
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not the proper preventive since it does not control nonbrokerage activities. 202
Firm solvency can better be protected by expanded supervision, 203 and investors might best be protected against loss by the establishment of a mandatory system of customer insurance for brokers. 204

Discriminatory Pricing.-The NYSE emphasized that the effects of a
competitive pricing system on the financial security of individual investors
are even,more far-reaching, for destructive competition also implies undue
discrimination in pricing. During slack periods brokers would cut their
rates to the level of variable costs only for the economically powerful institutional accounts. 205 At this low rate, the institutional accounts would be
making no contribution to fixed costs, so the broker would be forced to
shift all fixed costs to "smaller, less-powerful traders." 206 However, the
Justice Department views this development as remote since some brokers
could realize greater profits by undercutting the rates of the diversified
firms and specializing in small investor trading. 2D7 If necessary, a "posting
system" could be established under SEC auspices to require brokers to announce rates on small transactions,208 thus providing an inexpensive procedure for full disclosure.
The Department of Justice stresses two other characteristics of competitive rates: their substantial benefits to the securities market, and their
feasibility. Not only would prices be forced down to levels reflecting true
costs but the problems associated with reciprocity arrangements and giveups would be elirninated.209 Moreover, the quality of ancillary services
would be enhanced. By segregating the cost of these services from the
total commission cost, customers could avoid payments for "tie-in" services,
"churning," and "dead weight" promotional material. 2 w And since the institutional investor would still demand research services, the same information could be made available to small investors at a nominal fee. 211
The· feasibility of competitive rates is evidenced by past experience in institutional trading and trading in the over-the-counter markets. 212 Because
bargaining for give-ups by institutional investors is analogous to price
negotiations between buyers and sellers, competitive pricing "would [not] be
2D2Jd. at 180.
!d. at 181.
204Jd. The Department of Justice recommended a system of public insurance similar
to that established by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-31 (1964).
205 NYSE EcoNoMIC REP. at 83-87.
206Jd. at 84.
207 Justice Dep't Memo. at 185.
20BJd. at 188.
209 See supra notes 26-47 and accompanying text.
210 Justice Dep't Menio. at 82-84.
211Jd. at 86.
212Jd. at 88-96.
203
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any different ... mechanically, than what goes on today." 213 Furthermore,
the over-the-counter markets.in listed and unlisted securities have operated
without a fixed minimum with no adverse effects upon either the brokers
or the investing public. 2 1-1 Trading in these markets is "characterized by
vigorous, healthy competition at substantially lower rates." 215
_..., .
LDNCLUS!ON

When omnipresent antitrust policy coHides with a congressional attempt
to regulate a segment of the national economy, there remains the di..'Ecult
problem of reconciling conflicting mandates. ln resolving these conflicts
courts have had difficulty in formulating helpful principles beyond the
general rule that antitrust exceptions are narrowly construed. Subject to this
general rule, implied exemptions are based upon either the "pervasiveness"
of agency regulation or the "necessity" of the activity in question in achieving the objectives of the regulatory scheme. Juxtaposing the traditional
minimum commission rate structure of the NYSE with these standards,
SEC supervision of certain of the Exchange's self-regulatory activities lacks
a sufficiently explicit congressional directive for antitrust variables to be
considered "pervasive." Although "necessity" then remains the dispositive
factual inquiry, it must further be determined which forum can bestresolve
this issue.
Courts

Although one district court has bluntly concluded that the NYSE rate
structure is exempt from the antitrust laws, 21'6 subsequent courts may be
asked to decide whether the rate structure is "necessary" to the objectives
of the Exchange Act. If such a case arises, the burden of justifying the
rate structure's necessir-y would be upon the Exchange because an implied
exemption based on "necessity" operates as an affirmative defense to an
antitrust claim. The Court in Silver supponed this burden of proof allocation by remarking that an activity "within the scope and purposes of the
Securities Exchange Act may be regarded as justified in answer to the assertion of an antitrust claim." 211 The Department of Justice has persuasively
rebutted each argument the NYSE has put forth in support of an antitrust
exemption, and unless the Exchange can disprove the feasibility of the Justice Department's suggested alternatives 218 for avoiding the :financial hardships of competitive rates, the burden will not have been discharged.
213 !d. at 91.
214Jd. at 93.
215 !d. at 95.
216 Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., 250 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ill. 1966),
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 954 (1967).
217 373 U.S. at 361.
218 See text at notes 187-89, 203-04, 208 supra.

aff'd, 371 F.2d 409
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The more important question, however, is whether a court is the proper
forum for resolving the "necessity" issue. In most antitrust trials, the ultimate disposition is a factual determination supported by extensive factual
data. But in judging the effects of a competitive_ pricing system on the
securities market, the courts are faced with diverse economic theories, all
speculative in nature. The judicial system does not have the flexibility to
fashion and adopt an imaginative remedy repleat with appropriate safeguards; the judge can only decide either that the rate structure is necessary
and therefore exempt from the antitrust laws, or that the structure is unnecessary and open to antitrust attack. Where the ultimate decision has
profound effects upon the economy, and where alternative forums for resolving the issue are available, the courts should exercise restraint and leave
jurisdiction to more flexible and expert bodies.
Congress

Because of the far-reaching effects that may result from an application
of the antitrust laws to the NYSE's minimum rate structure, the "necessity"
issue is of a uniquely legislative character and could best be handled by
Congress. If minimum rates are essential, an express statutory exemption
from the antitrust laws can be enacted; otherwise, Congress can expose the
rate structure to the antitrust laws or abolish minimum rates completely.
Congress might also determine that the SEC is the most appropriate body to
decide the rate structure issue; clear legislative language could easily confer
the necessary jurisdiction, either with or without an antitrust exemption.
Congress, however, has previously been requested to resolve these problems
and has refused to act. 219

New York Stock Exchange
The most expedient method of handling the problems posed by the
NYSE's minimum rate structure is for the Exchange itself to attempt to
resolve the issue, either by an abolition of minimum rates, or more realistically, by adopting a plan whereby minimum rates are gradually lowered
in specified types of transactions until the effects of total abolition can be
determined. If the exchange truly believes that minimum rates are necessary
to the securities industry, it at least has the responsibility of demonstrating
the impracticability of the Justice Department's suggested alternative
measures. Unfortunately, such a responsibility has not yet been accepted
by the NYSE. In the incipient phases of the present controversy, the
Exchange favored the retention of give-ups, but after the intervention of the
219

See note 161 supra.
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Department of Justice, the Exchange restricted give-ups 220 and adopted an
interim commission rate structure221 in an effort to shield itself from antitrust attack. Similarly, the NYSE's economic study concluded that fixed
rates were necessary; however, continued criticism appears to have influenced the Exchange to reconsider its position by initiating a new study. 222
A more open approach by the NYSE would have the advantage of engaging
the expertise and experience of that bod}' in exploring the feasibilir; of
competitive rates. .Moreover, such an approach would demonstrate that the
Exchange's entrenched position is motivated by the public interest, not by
a desire to solidify its lucrative monopoly on the commission business.

Securities Exchange Commission
Because of the expertise of the SEC in the securities area, and because
the Commission is ostensibly neutral and apolitical, that body is the most
realistic choice to resolve the "necessity" issue. By applying its expertise to
the information gathered in the recent hearings, the SEC may be able to
determine whether the minimum rates are necessary to fulfill the policies
of the Exchange Act. If so, the Commission can authorize the NYSE to
continue its present practices, but under more detailed supervision. If the
minimum rate structure is not necessary, the Commission, pursuant to section 19(b), can order the Exchange to institute a competitive system.
However, considering the speculative nature of the economic issue, it is
probable that a concrete resolution is impossible. Therefore, the SEC has the
responsibility to use its discretion in seeking a solution to the controversy.
At present, the most feasible solution is the Justice Department's suggestion223 that minimum commissions be eliminated immediately on transactions
over 1~50,000, with a 1PO,OOO reduction every year for the ensuing five years.
While this plan appears to discriminate against the small investor, it allows
the SEC to evaluate the effects of eliminating the minimum rate structure
before total elimination .
The need for careful evaluation prior to any transition to competitive rates
has been demonstrated by the length and completeness of the SEC hearings.
Because of the historical existence of the minimum rate structure and the
NYSE's insistence that minimum rates are necessary to a viable securities
industry, the courts, Congress~ the ]\J''/SE and the SEC have been reluctant
to change the status quo without knowing the full consequences of such a
change. The speculative nature of a shift to competitive rates and the
sensitivity of the securities business surely demand caution, but not inaction.
P. C. G.
See note 37 sup·ra.
221 See notes 51 & 54 mpra.
222 See note 54 supu1. The 1'-,TYSE has recently challenged the Dep't of Justice's economic position. CCI-1 FED. SEc. L. REP. (Current vol.) ~ 77,707 (1969).
223 See note 7 supm.
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